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SUMMARY
L
In order to establish compliance with recent changes to British Civil Air-
worthiness Requirements it has been necessary to develop methodology for
assessment of catastrophic risks resulting from uncontained turbine engine
rotors.
The methodology was developed during the course of the Concorde SST certifi-
cation programme, utilising an engine failure model for the Olympus 593.
[[
In essence this work is applicable to any aircraft type, but it has been
established that some of the data used produces unrealistically pessimistic
assessments.
Work continues to develop realistic guideline data for use in these assess-
ments, which can be used for future aircraft design.
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1 • Introduction
Gordon Gunstone in his paper "Engine Non Containment -
The U.K.C.A.A. View" has explained the thinking which has
led to the latest British Civil Airworthiness Requirement
in respect of en_.lne non-containment hazards.
Alan,s.ida this one has had to develop nmuerlc methodology by
the use of which compliance with the requirement can be shown.
As will be appreciated new requirements cannot be imposed
overnight, and in fact the present B.C.A._. Is the culmination
of some years of Joint work between CAA an_ the British Aircraft
industry, so that the methodoloKy has tend_t to be developed
alongside the developing requirement.
Beinc a numeric method, somewhat greater precision can be given
to answering the question ',where should minimising the risk atop?"
However it must be emphasised that a numeric answer is an aid to •
engineering Judgement and can never entirely replace it. For
_. example, if an assessment showed compliance with B.C.A.R., but
one particular risk, which could be reduced without excessive.
penalties, constituted a major part of the total risk, it would
be expected that design action to reduce this risk would be
taken.
_- A sugary of the foregoing appe_s in Figure |.
It oannot today be claimed that the methods are perfect and
indeed considerably more work is required to establish _
_tlsfaotory dat.8 values in certain areas which require the ' '
use of Judgements. However it Is hop_fully of interest to i
members of the workshop to have some idea of the present
position, i
2, Bapk_round : 1
I
The current B.C.A.R, Is summarised in FigUre 2, and employs a 1
relatively elmpl& failure model.
This was not always the case, and the story of the practical
development of the new requirement and its associated
methodology really began with the Concords, Here, because of
•. the relatively unorthodox layout of the aircraft, the degree of
hazard minimising required for parity with subsonic types was
'_ not _uediately obvious. Additionally, _Lthough the aircraft
, in its conception In 1962 had accounted for the possibility of
1_ _ J turbine rupture, accumulating evidence over the years indicated
the necessity for considering compressor debris as well. Not
unnaturally argument developed between the conetruoters and the :
: ARE (88 the CAA then was) as to the reqtdred precautions. Since
numerical methods of airworthiness analysis were a fundamental
wt of Concords certification, it seemed logical to extend
•; this to consideration of engine non-contalnment risks. It was
therefore a_reed to mike an assessment auslnst an en_rlne failure
model to be derived by Rolls-Royce as the most probable failure
dolzia b@sed on previous non-containment experience and the
knowledge of the Olyopus construction. "/'his resulted in the
Bodel shown in Fi_twe 3, which took throe years and numerous
meotln_s to producer
The requirement was that the probability of catastrop.,e
should not be worse than 10 °8 per aircraft hour, and in
order to achieve this a number of changes were made to the
aircraft, primarily as a result of the inclusion of
compressor debris. These changes are shown in Figure 4 and 5
the former indicating the armour plate necessary to prevent
penetration of the fuel tanks and the latter showing systems
layout and fire precautions modl.icat_.ons.
It will be noted tlmt the model 4id not include _ compressor
disc pieces, since at the time the model was agreed, no
Rolls-Royce axial engine had ever had a major compressor
disintegration. Subsequent events, however, led CAA to review
the situation and to require an assessment of the effect of the
random release of two _ compressor disc pieces. Since there
were insufficient statistics to define the probability of the
event, it was not possible to include these pieces in the model,
and a new requirement criterion had to be developed. At this
;" stage, a requirement akin to the present DCAR was introduced
for the compressor _ disc pieces, such that the probability of
catastrophe per event, averaged across the flight should not
be worse than a given number. Originally CAA would have liked
to see I in 20, but this was not possible to achieve, the actual
_- value being something like half of this. Ilowever an assesmnent, :
by the same methods and to the same standards, of 8 number of
established aircraft showed that these aircraft had no better
probability of catastrophe, and In some cases considerably worse.
It was therefore apparent that parity at least with olLrrent
aircraft types was established.
The final result of this effort, over a period of some six years
; was 8 certification report two inches thick and working
doctunentation and drawings occupying over 50 cubic feet.
In retrospect this model was probably much too complicated and
the precautions taken would have been similar had today's DCAR
model been used, since _ disc pieces and disc rim fragments
dominated the exercise. Nevertheless it did result in the
development of methodology which with further refinement can
be applied to any aircraft.
3. tlethodolo_
.--*/ 3.1, Basic Work
,_ The lniUal stages of the mss essnent consist of the
following steps,
8) _tabllah a hazard tree (Flt_wo 6). This will
_ _ essentially be the same for all aircraft, but
my vary In detail, particularly where methods
of operation of flying controls differ.
b) Establish debris slze for each st4qTe of the
enBlnt (Figure 7),
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c) Draw plan view of fly off zone (Figure 8) for
each stake, identifying potential risk items
(e.g. systems, fuel tanks, other engines etc.)
d) Draw section through fly off zone (Figure 9)
establishing _.isk angles for each item potentially
at risk. It is assumc_i that _ disc pieces will not
be stopped, but in the case of the disc rim pieces,
structural analysis is required to determine whether
at some structural interface the piece will be
stopped. The example in Figure 10 shows that engine
controls and fuel tank Are potentially at risk but
that flying controls and electrtcs _re not.
3.2. Data and Assumptions
3.2.1. Flight Phases
It will be remembered that the hazard assessment ,
is avL._ra_ed throughout the flight, and there will
be some risks which are onlT present during certain _'
phases of flight. Hence it Is necessary to break
: d_m the flight to well defined phases, and while
this breakdown could vary with the aircraft mission, ,_
it )ms been found so far that th._ three phases ,_.
shown in Ftf_are 11 are suitable for Jet transport
types, r.
3.2.2. Fa!lure distribution b_ fl!_ht phase _,
In assessing the overall risks it is necessary _
to consider the percentage of failures occurring
In each phase. In practice this can only be
established statistically and Fibre 12 show: 4
the values obtained from three sources. So far, [
in DAC's assessments, the Eolls-_oyco values have
been used_ but these are identical with HTSB for ?
'- the phases In use. CAAts analysis gives a sllchtly
higher weighting to the take-off phase and some
' re-thinking here may be necessary.
/ 3.2.3. Guidelines
In conslderin_ the potential hs:ards froa
,:, lnd'.vldual contributory factors, some 1terns can
. be dealt with as matters of fact. For example in
. systems areas the design of the aircraft will *
establish clearly whether a catastrophe can or
: cannot occur due to the lois of a given system
or systems.
In other areas, notably loss of adoqtmte thrust,
fire, and structural dlmaRo an element of Judgment
Is required. In these cacao guidelines have been
discussed and provisionally agreed with CAA.
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3.2.4. Loss of adequate thrust
Figure 13 shows the probability of catastrophe
(i.e. of not being able to land the aircraft
safely) for the loss oi multiple engines.
Apparent inconsistencies will be noted, and
these have resulted from CAAFli_ht Department
knowledge of the handling of the particular
aircraft types considered. It is thought that ,
for design assessment of new types, a more
conslstent set of nunbor, needs to be established.
3.2.5. Fire Hazards
Figure 34 shows the factors considered in establishinR
. fire hazards. In this IR. the ignition probability
is a powerful factor and Figure 15 Elves the CAA
guideline values.
3.2.6. Structural damage /
Figure 16 shows the CAA guideline Ior the minimum
static ultimate strength requirement to be used
in considerin_ the size of catastrophic holes in _!
primary structure. |
3.3. Calculations
I_ving completed the basic work of section 3._. .
(establishing the risk angle) and assessed the risk
factor for each hazard, using where appropriate, the
assumptions from section 3.2., it is now possible to
draw for each flight phase and each stage a diagram of
risk an_le versus risk factor as shown in Figure |7.
" (In practice it will probably be found that one dia,.oram {covera several s'_ages, all producing the same angles
and factors.)
The individual risks are then summed aa shown at the
bottom of the figure, usinR success theory for summing
_ overlapping risks, I.e.
Thereafter the averaging method shown on Figure 18,
_, will result in the mean catastrophic risk to the 0
air_._aft across a typical flight mission.
t
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4. Results
In _rder to validate the above Methods and assumptions, BAC have
been analysing a range of current aircraft to evaluate the
catastrophic risk level due to _ disc pieces. The results appear
on Figure 19, and are indeed surprising, with risks varying from
| in 6.9 for an under_In_, narrowbody twin to ! in 27..8 for •
wldebody trijet, with only two of the types considered meeting
BCAR'.
The actual in-se_vlce world wide record derived from the number of
fatal accidents compared with the n.mber of major disc releases
gives • value of •pprox/utely i In 30. In can be argued therefore
that current sutrcraft on average nust in practice be complying with
BCAR, and hence the •ssesl,_ents must be pesshnistlc.
Work is contlnuinc to Id_.ntlfy and study the areas of pessimism,
with the objective of modifying the _uldellnes where necessary.
PJ an end result it is hoped to a_ree a set of realistic ground
rules with CAA wh/ch wall be suitable for future aircraft design
_/_ t.
Reference to FiL_u'e 19 w_ll show tht the most recurrin_ major
ceataributory factors awe structural damage and f/ros, and hence
thue are receiv/ng aider attention.
W/th particular regard to crltlc&t cut le_rths-in fuselage
structure, work Is leading to a more sophisticated mmlysis of
. the reslduat structural strength based on the fracture toughness
of the skin uaterial and the ncatn&t ix/a1 stress before dan•Re
(_e 20).
Even this may still be pess/aimtlc /n meeting the requ/rement of
F/guts 16, sud I_n'l_ps this requlrmeet should be further
queSt.toned. WhO, for example, cu the basis of analysis, vmuld
Imve believed that the sdz_att shown in Fipwe 25 could have
suffered this amount of _ and surv/ved - but it did;
6. Coe_.lLuslon s
IXethadolo,#,y has been estsbllshed to uselm the cstastrophl¢
risks froo oncontaJned rotor debris, but furth_ _k Is
requ/red to re_ine the lmmmpticms use_ so an to brin_ the
• results into accord with the known _aots. Whe_ this is
/ done it should be possible, us/n_ _reod standards of
/ 18Be•murat, to [_oduce cost e_fective desiEn I_e_suti_-s
a_s/nst rotor fs/lure on future a/z_r&ft types.
AmmledXm,,t.,
11_ author vish_ to ths_ British _ir_ft _ti_
for permission to _tve this _, and oollm_ues,
J_rticulawly !11". B. Tufn@ll. for h_p in i_ _l_ticu.
Op/nions expressedawethose of the auth_ and do not
neousm'ily :qremt the _lew of British Ail_att Cmqxwatlcu.
so
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O METHODOLOGY DEVELOPED TO MEET
NEW CAA REQUIREMENTS.
• GIVES MORE PRECISION TO SAFETY
ASSESSMENT- BUT"
@ DOES NOT REPLACE ENGINEERING
JUDGEMENT.
Figure1. - EngineNon-containmentU.K. RiskAssessmentMethods.
DEBRIS ACCEPTABLE_ N° SPREAD
TYPE CATASTROPHIC OF ANGLE MASS REMARKS ,
RISK LEVEL PIECES
TRANSLATIONAL
ONE-THIRD ONE-THIRD ENERGY(NEGLECTING
DISC 1 in 20 1 ° 3"- BLADEDDISC ROTATIONALENERGY}
FRAGMENT MASS.
GREATEROF_)_
DISC RIM BLADED ISC TRANSLATIONAL
PIECE 1in 60 1 _-5" HASSORMASS E_ERGY(NEGLECTINGDFTWOBLAOESROTA_ONALENERGY}
WITH ROOTS
APPLICABLE10 OUPLICATEO
MULTIPLEONE- AS FORSINGLEORMULTIPUCATEDSYSTEMS
THIRD DISC 1in 10 3 -_3" ONE-THIRD ONLY.ENERGYASDEFINED
/ FRAGMENTS DISCFRAGMENTFORSINGLEONE-THIRD
_, DISC FRAGMENT.
E
_- 1, AVERAGE OFALL DISCS & ALL ENGINES ACROSSTYPICAL
FLIGHT PLAN.
2.NO SINGLE DISC MUST HAVE RISK GREATER THAN
:" TWICE THE REQUIREDAVERAGE RISK.
FigureZ - BCAREngineFailureModel.
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DEBRIS L'ONTRIBUTION
TYPE HOURS REMARKS
1. EQUAL PROBABILITYOVER
/3 BLADED DISC 360"
TRANSLATIONAL ENERGY
RIM PIECE8 BLADES
MINOR DISC SIZE g ENERGY VALUE
FRAGMENTS DEFIr.IEOFOR EACH STAGE
TURBINE BLADES
[HIGH ENERGY) MAX BLADE Fr,"_3Y
BLADES 55"/.0; NAX BLADE
(LOW ENERGY} ENERGY
MULTIPLE
BLADES BLADES I00"/.ENERGY
DISC RIM RIM PIECEgBLADES WITH
ENERGY VALUE
i PIECE FOR EACH STAGE
COMPRESSORI _--_S MAX BLADE ENERGY
I BLADES 55"1. OF MAX BLADE
(LOW ENERGY ENERGY
Figuret - Olympus593FailureModel.
,,,_----NACELLE SIDEWALL ARMOUR.
• Ft_'E .Y
... .... " • .
PROTECTIONOF FUEL PROTECTION OF HYDRAULIC
TANKSAND SYSTEM. BAYAND FLYING ODNTROLS.
Figure4. - Concorde-ArmourPlate.
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GREN/YELLOW HYORAUUCS_ _SEGN.OFiES _NTIAL7 ..,rBU._ELLOW HVDRAUUCS.
, I_,,L__E.LEClO3LES-.%,(I.,K'XI--
/_,, I.,,,_ " __1 I- " '%. I_, I "
HYDRAULIC_N
FUEl. $.0. VALVES_ SYSTEMPIPE.
' DUPLICATEDELECTRICS /HvrI_m'rF_'HOUTEE/ r--|NTUIWESCE'NT PAINT ON COVERS
TC_ SHUT-C_V_VES. / -,::__E_" _ FJe'n.u_mINTS0_ WI_\. LOWER SKIN PANELS.
SECONI:_ AIR I:X)_S.. ; /._./,F;RE EXTINGUI:_IERS I __J,L_ II . _._,"" _ ,.I.L" .
RESINFIBRE- A | I J:
" - GLASS_r.AJ..ING_I _ " _--I,,,--._ I'_IlIlI_'_NT
w.v_ IN ..I...II./I.PANELS(lOP
MATERIAL OF FLYING_ DEPTH
Cgl4_S (}IANGED rJiOiNAiR ISOLATION IMPFiOVlEO_J_UNG TITANIUM SFJ_ING
TO TITANIUM. V.lU.VIE(CLOSEOBY INT_T i:_INT. PAIxELS. _.THERMOSWITCH} N3DED
IN EACH AIR SI._Y
LINE. FIRE PRECAUTIONS
, SYSTEMS
o
Figure5. - Concorde- DesignPrecautionstoMinimiseRdorFailureDamage_
4
I
I I I II---I '--
I . I
I I I ! I'_
' _ 10a_C,E_I0_,_'_:,E1OI
IC0m'_.$]iBC_USTI
•
Figure5. - EngineRotorFailure- HazardTree.
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, f',l.;;,
r- BLADED DISC RADIUS
_ _
hr
r
_13 DISC PIECE DiSC RIM PIECE
Figure7. - BCARDebris.
4
ELEVA'IOR(1) ENGINE CONTROLS.
• FuEL_ '
, i
/ .
/
pLANVIEWOF
; REAR FUSELAGE. HYDRAULICS
I
Figure8. - TypicalFlyOffZone.
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• oQ.
ANGLE OF
IITEM AT RISK. EMISSION.
!ENGINE. 85"- 100"
ICONTROLS 99"-113"(FLYING -ENGINE]
s3:,62".oneSTRUCTURE STRUCTURE 126-_39
o"
ENGINE
STRUCTURE
Figure9. - DebrisTrajectories.
!
ENER6YINSUFFIENTTO PEIETRATE I
a .__D_/_ "_ _-_1_
Figure1(1 - StructurallyUmit=lTrajectory.
=
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1. TAKE OFF -START OF ROLL TO V1
2. TAKE OFF-V 1 TO 1.500 FT.
3. POST TAKE OFF-1500 FT TO TOUCHDOWN.
Figure1L - FlightPhaseBreakdown.
.2s'1.' 2_.1. .-I. 24"1. 9"1. 5'1. IJ ®] i " '
. 51"1, 49"1, j N.T.S.B.
55'1, /,5"/, C A.A.• 35"1, , 20"!, 22"/, 14 1, 3°1, 6"1, @
! i1
• : -.2Ji1 ,A;;'.'.;;'-;" i.....: - --- REDUCTION.Vz YR ,
TAKE" OFF CLIMB CRUISE 3ESCENT N:t:I_ACHi
(_ ROLLS'ROYCE ENGINES ( 195¢'1970 STATISTICS)
:. (_ X.l".S.S. REPORT NTSB- AAS- 74 -4.
(_) CAA-GUNSTON, "ENGINE NON CONTAZNMENT" THE UK CAA view."
Figure17. - Distributionof UncontainedFailuresOverFlightPhases.
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QNOOF ENGINESLOST
FLIGHT PHASE AICRAFT TYPE1 2 3 4
0 TO Vl 0 0 REAR OR UNDERWING
V1 TO 1,500FT 0 -7 ENGINED TWIN-JET.
POST 1,500FT 0 -6
u
0 TO V1 0 0 0
Vt TO 1,500FT 0 .4 -85 REAR ENGINED TRI-JET
POST 1,500FT 0 0 •75
0 TO V1 0 0 0 0
V1 TO 750FT 0 .8 -8 .8 FOURREARMOUNTED
750 TO 150OFT 0 -2 -5 -8 ENGINES.
POST 1500 FT 0 O "2 -7
0 TO VI 0 O N/A 0
VI TO 1,500FT 0 -25 N/A "7 FOUR UNDERWING PODDED
POST 1.500FT 0 0 N/A "6 ENGINES.
Figure13. - RiskFactorsfor LossofThrusL (Expressedasa fractionoft )
. /
RISK
FLIGHT_ TM TR IR HR LR ER
PHASE
GROUND ROLL
TO VI
V1 TO 1,500FT
POST 1,500 FT
4
_- TR = PROPORTIONOF FLIGHT PHASE THATFUEL IS PRESENTIN PENETRATED
; TANK.
IR " IGNITION PROBABILITY.
HR = PROBABILITYOFFIRE SITUATIONBECOMINGPOTENTIALLYC_TOSTROPHIC.
LR - PROBABILITYOF NOT LANDINGSAFELYAND EVACUATINGPASSENGERS
WITH POTENTIALLYCATASTROPHICFIRE. '
_" ER ="PROBABILITYOFA CATASTROPHICEXPLOSIONAT INSTANT OF
" PENETRATION= IR X STRUCTURALRESISTANCETO OVERPRESSURE.
PROBABIUTYOF CATASTROPHE=(TR x IR x HRX LR) + ER
, Figure14. - RiskFactorsforFuelTankFireandExplosion.
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AUTAGt Ip"
FUEL 2' " . -f/in2) ,
PIPE-'_ _ [ I REP' - ,,,'O0"F(37.8C)PYLON3_ DRY I I 60 , ", / _ AVTURIJFI)
: \/ I _ 1"0kN(0'151b_.in2) .
F_-E _--'..j I"_, \ _ \REID VPat 100°F(378C)(A_)P"P'_ENETRATING _ ,_', \ _/ ,._ \/
-. DEBRIS o40 ,\_/--/.l>"_"', _/?/'._ _'\
FUEL TEMP ABOVE LOWER FLAMMABILITY o :_._!/. ':/:.__\ k
(
LIMIT FOR VAPOURASSUME80), 830 l_'l"'l" " _l --_'_"/_\ \
PROBABILITY OF FIRE. _ i_ i _6_,_'_i .!i/'...._"FUEL TEMP WITHIN MIST REGION _2o " -
ASSUME 5"/.PROBABILITY OF FIRE AT '.,'_k'[C,_/ _,,,_,"_ \
-50"C RISING LINEARLY TO 80"/.AT 10 I,".T,C,_<'\-", _(c>/',_ \
=." "1".".'< ,.'.." //v ,,-.,\ \ ,
LOWER FLAMMABILITY LIMIT FOR IK_, _"._ /./Y __/-'/\ \C__.", .,_i._, , , ,_, , ,
VAPOUR. -60 -30 0 50 100
FUEL TEMP {'C)
FLAMMIBILITY LIMITS FOR F'UEL VAPOUR AND MIST
DRY _-'.'VAF_LIF_ "":". :-,_" I".:;.::'[.i':"...'_:_'I'._I"::V._.'._R._:.:._:.:.T!
............ ... i.__.::.:_ _.:_ eT-_q
- !- I_IEL.'__:'Z- (_
FUEL TEMP WITHIN FLAMMABILITY LIMITS FOR
FUEL TEMP WITHIN FLAMMABILITY VAPOUR AND DEBRIS PENETRATES TANK BELOW
LIMITS FOR VAPOUR AND DEBRIS FUEL SURFACEANp PASSES THROUGH ULLAGE
PENETRATES ULLAGE SPACE WITHOUT SPACE.ASSUME 70LPROBABILITYOF EXPLOSION.
PASSING THROUGH FUEL. ASSUME gO'/. :--FUEL TEMP IS WITHIN MIST REGION ASSUMEE-/_PROBABILITY OF AN EXPLOSION AT-50"C
PROBABILITY OF AN EXPLOSION. RISING LINEARLY TO 70"I.AT LOWER
FLAMMABILITY LIMIT FOR VAPOUR.
Figure 15. - Ignition RiskFactors, IR.
A. 70_/.LIMIT FLIGHT MANOEUVERING LOAD.
.. 20 FT//SECEAS GUST (VERTICALOR LATERAL)AT Vc
_' COMBINED WITH MAXIMUM CABIN DIFFERENTIAL
PRESSURE (PLUS AERODYNAMIC SUCTION).
B. 1.1 (MAXIMUM NORMAL CABIN DIFFERENTIAL
_-. PRESSURE AT TIME OF INCIDENT PLUS AERODYNAMIC
SUCTION) PLUS Ig FLIGHT LOAD FREEDOM FROM
FLUTTERUP TO Vc.
Figure16.- MinimumStaticUltimateStrengthRequirement
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HAZARD 0" 30" 60" 90" 120" 150" 180"
FLYING CONTROLS
IN FUSELAGE.
FUSELAGE STRUCTURAL
RISK.
WING STRUCTURAL
RISK.
FIN AND RUDDER
STRUCTURALRISK.
FLYING TAIL
STRUCTURALRISK.
INTER ENGINE
EFFECTS.
ENGINE CONTROLS.
FUEL TANK FIRES.
a
t
f
SUMMATIONOF OVERLAPPING
RI.SKS.BYSUCCESSTHEORY
{1-(_-F,)(1-F_)--} ,',
EG 1-(1-0"4}(1-0.05)
' 1-('6 X95) ='43 60" INBOARD_ J
Figure1?. - HazardSummaryDiagram.
FOR EACH ENGINE STAGEIN EACH FLIGHT PHASE
• DERIVE POTENTIALLYCATASTROPHICANGLES(oC)FOR EACH HAZARD.
• DERIVE.RISK FACTOR(F) FOR EACH HAZARD. 4
• CALCULATECOMBINEDRISK FACTOR(Csp] FORTHE PHASE AND AVERAGE t-
OVER 360"(n RISKS) !
c_=Dpx(=,F,,d,F,....=.Fn) Dp=PHASEF_LUREnISTR_nON
THE.___.NN
• SUM COMBINEDRISK FACTORFORTHE STAGEOVER THE TOTALFLIGHT
' ('P'PHASES) TO OBTAINOVERALL STAGERISK(Cs}.
;_' i CS = CSP14"CsP2.... CSPp
': ,_ • AVERAGEALL STAGESOVER THE TOTALENGINE('S'STAGES)10 OBTAIN
_ MEAN ENGINE RISK(Cs)
,, CE= Csl+ Csz..... Css
* " S
" • AVERAGEALL ENGINES OVER THE NRCRAFT(E'EN6INES) TO OBTAIN
MEAN AIRCRAFT RISK (CA)
:. CA = CE1 "1"CE2.... CEE
E
FigureI& - EngineRdorFailure- RbkEvaluation.
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CATASTFC.aHIC
AIRCRAFT TYPE R!SK RATIO MAJOR CONTRIBUTARY FACTORS.
TWO REAR ENGINES - ,Ct. LOSS OF ADEQUATE THRUST.
:1 IN 23.3 ;
NARROWBODY "2.FUSELAGE STRUCTURAL DAMAGE.
TWO UNDERWlNG ENGINES- il. FUEL TANK FIRES.
NARROWBODY 1 IN 6"9
THREE REAR ENGINES - 1. FUSELAGE/FIN STRUCTURALDAMAGE
I IN 9'2 2.FIRE.
NARROWBODY 3.LOSS OF ADEQUATE THRUST.
FOUR REAR ENGINES - I.LOSS OF ADEQUATE THRUST.
I IN 12'?
NARROWBODY
FOUR UNDERWING ENGINES- I.WING STRUCTURAL DAMAGE.
1 IN 15.8
NARROWBODY 2. FUSELAGE STRUCTURAL DAMAGE.
ONE REAR, TWO iJNDERWlNG ,,---,--,/-,--,-.,-,-,-,,,1.FUSELAGE STRUCTURAL DAMAGE.
E._GINES- WIDE BODY I IN 2?'8 _'2.WING STRUCTURAL DAMAGE.
FOUR UNDERWING ENGINES 1.WING STRUCTURAL DAMAGE.
1 IN 15.9
WIDE BODY 2. FUSELAGE STRUCTURAL DAMAGE, :
STATISTICS 1 ZN 30 I
Figure19.- Summaryof BACAssessmentsforSingle113DiscPiece.
AN APPROXIMATION OF CRITICAL CRACK LENGTH FOR
CATASTROPHIC CIRCUMFERENTIAL FUSELAGE DAMAGE IS
GIVEN BY THE FOLLOWING, AND HAY BE USED FOR
CRACKS OF UP TO 100 INCHES IN LENGTH.
2
,,. CRACK LENGTH 2ac= 2 (I.74Kc )
"IT 5
WHERE Kc=FRACTURE TOUGHNESS OF SKIN MAT LI,
:-, 6 = NOMINAL AXIAL STRESS BEFORE
_; DAMAGE UNDER CRITICAL LOADING
CASE
Figure20. - Catastrophic113DiscFuselageDamage.
' 6O
I,
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Figure2L - FuselageDamage- BkCl-lk
i
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DISCUSSION
John Meaney, Rohr
I have a question on the armor plate slide that you showed on the
Concorde. What material is that and what total weight impact was it, and
what was the largest energy magnitude that your're trying to absorb?
J.C. Wallin, BAC
The material was titanium. We looked at a number of different
materials including non-metallics and so on, and found in the end that
titanium was the lightest that we could use. For our testing the fragment
that we dealt with was a full energy single blade which in the failure model
was the equivalent (in energy terms) of a disk ring piece plus _ couple of
blades, (which having penetrated the casing, will have lost some energy).
From the point of view of armor design, the single blade was a critical
s
piece because; of course, you had the highest impact pressure (acting on'the
small area). We designed on that criterion. The actual weight we added to
the airplane was something of the order of a thousand pounds. I said earlier
/ (when I was commenting on I think it was Ken Forney's talk this morning) it
could well be that in the case of an airplane of this particular configuration _
that the extra containment within the engine to cope with a rim-and-three-blades
• piece might have been more cost-effective. But I think that is applicable only
to this configuration of airplane. 0
J. Meaney, Rohr ,
What titanium metal alloy was used? For these pieces that you tested,
what weights and velocities were used?
J.C. Wallin, BAC
The material is commercially pure titanium. The biggest piece we had to
deal with was an LP 1 blade, which was five pounds in weight, with a velocity
of 680 fps.
J. Gausselin_ Rockwell International
•_ / In 1972 you people conducted tests, firing projectiles into fuel tanks, _
_-- to simulate the fan blades you were talking about. These were preliminary
tests and the conclusions were preliminary. You may be doin_more testing.
I haven't seen anything further in this program. Are you doing anythingO
further and if so, where can the results be obtained?
J.C. Wallin_ BAC
At the time we had to deal with the fuel tanks because we thought that
blades being fired into fuel tanks (where the blade passed through the fuel
before it got into the vapor space), was probably not a very high ignition
risk. So we started doing these tests to try to generate some data to prove
our case if you like. Now, in point of fact wh_t we came up with was that
_ 0 °
within the first six firings, we generated four explosions, due to titanium
blades nicking structure. We had been looking at the prime ignition source
as being the blade temperature. What we found was that when we fired the
blade into a representative tank, as soon as the blade hit the structure inside
the tank, even though it passed through the fuel in the first place, we actually
generated sparks of sufficient magnitude to set off the explosion. At that
point we abandoned our original line of thinking and, therefore, abandoned the
tests. I think in that respect, even if we had been right in our original
thinking, the cost of the testing we would have had to have done to prove our
case would have been so high that we would probably have abandoned it anyway.
This was because we would have needed to do it a thousand times or so with no
ignition to prove the case statistically. Since we could, in fact, get explosions
in the tank if titanium blades were being fired into it, we faced up to the facts
and decided to deveioF our armor for the tanks.
One other thing that we found in general, both in the case of firing into
tanks and also doing our armor testing, was that a lot of the information which
you get from ballistic firings (typical of military projectiles) is totally
irrelevant to the engine burst case where one is dealing with non-uniform shapes
and sharp corners. With things of that sort, the results can be very different
from those derived from bullet firings.
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